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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JA~IES SDR-4-UES and \TIRGINIA 
Z~\:JJBUKOS, 
PZaintijfs and Respondents, 
Vl!l. 
S_.AJ.I RONDO'S, 
Defendant ·and AppelZan.t. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT'S 
I 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
80031 
This action was commenced by respondents to en-
join the appellant from' trespassing upon property owned 
by respondents, and for damages resulting therefrom. 
Upon respondents' motion the damage action was dis-
missed. 
Appellant's pleading, until the day of trial, con-
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sisted of a general denial of the allegations of respon-
dents' complaint. At the trial, an amended answer and 
counterclaim was filed, wherein appellant sought to es-
tablish a right-of-way over all of respondents' land not 
occupied by buildings. The trial court held that appell-
ant had not ·established ~such right-of-way. 
Respondents' buildings consist of structures on the 
Southeast Corner of Second South and West Temple 
Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. They own a frontage of 
125 f~et on Second South Street and of 128Yz feet on 
West Temple Street. The buildings are occupied by re-
tail stores. The wall of a building, owned by third par-
ties, is erected on the 'South line of respondents' pro-
perty, and extends from the West Temple Street side-
walk line to the East, approximately 76 feet. This struc-
ture, together with the Southern structure of respon-
dents' building, forms an alley-way extending from West 
Temple Street Eastward for 76 feet, into an area-way 
approximately 90 feet square. In this 90-foot area are 
thrre·e on·e-story structures, two of which consist of ex-
tensions to respondents' and appellant's buildings, which 
face on S'econd South Street, and the third is a double 
garage owned by respondents, and located to the rear of 
appellant's premises. Access to this rear area, above re-
ferred to, could be and was had from three sides, the 
West, South, and East. 
There is no pleading on the part of app·ellant to the 
effect that he claims a 12 x 165 foot right-of-way to the 
rear of his premises. Nor is there any pleading, or any 
p~roof, as to the extent of the burden of such purported 
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right-of-\Yay. Nor ran the extent of such use, or claim~ed 
n~t"}. be detern1ined from a reading of appellant's brief. 
The testin1ony offered to establish such right-of-
way "~as giYen through two elderly gentlemen, Richard 
C. Latimer and A. F. Gotberg. A fair statement of their 
testimony is as follows : 
LA.\.Tll\IER TESTIMONY 
This ,,-i tness testified that he had· been connected 
with the operation of the property owned by ap-pellant 
for practically all his life, and, insofar as there was a 
manager, he managed it (Tr. 129, 132). On direct exam-
ination, he stated that coal had been brought to these 
premises from West Temple Street over the 76 foot 
right-of-way at irregular periods. On cross-examination, 
he stated positivr.ely that he had never seen coal delivered 
to appellant's premises in his life (Tr. 143). 
This 'ntness testified, futher, that he had never 
discussed a right-of-,yay with respondents, their prede-
cessor in title, or any one else during his life, and that 
he had never claimed a right-of-way (Tr. 13.6, 146, 147). 
He had frequently seen respondents and their prede-
cessors in title and talked with them. 
Mr. Latimer also testified that aoccess to the rear 
of his premises was obtained both from the South and 
from the East (Tr. 145, 146). He also testified that he 
had never seen an~~ of the work being actually done on 
his building, except for some bricks which were stored 
on his premises. H·e also testified that his building had 
been leased ~to Jim Latsis from the early 1920's until 
1938 and from 1939 or 1940 it was leas~ed to Mr. La:tsis 
' 
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and Mr. Sdrales and Bob Latsis, the nephew of Jim Lat-
sis. In this connection, it will be noted that Mr. Latsis 
and Mr. Sdrales owned re'Spondents' premises. from 1939 
until the presen't time. 
He further testified that a party by the name of 
Jack Moore rented his pren1ises for app·roximately a 
year, and that Mr. Moore tried to p~ark his car at the rear 
of the premises, but was forced to move. 
GOTBERG TESTIMONY 
This witness testified that a fence was built on ap-
pellant's property along the South line, where it joined 
the North line of respondents' property, and that, by 
reason of the position of the garage and this fence, con-
siderable difficulty was encountered when coal was de-
livered over this fence to the stoker (Tr. 1'53, 154, 157, 
164). H·e testified tha:t from 1893 to 1930, practically all 
traffic, except the delivery of coal, came from the right-
of-way to the South, and not the 12 x 76 foot right-of-
way to the West, and that he'd seen coal delivered "quite 
often'' over this period. 
Tr. 161 and 162:-
''Q Before 1933 and for, 'Say from 1893, when you 
went there until 1930, this was all open for 
traffic in through here, wasn't it~ 
A Yes, all of it. They offered me to let me park 
my car, when I first got one, for fifty cents a 
week. 
~ 
Q But there was considerable 'traffic behind 
these buildings all around through here· and 
around~ 
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:\ ... \nd thi~ beaut~,. parlor, n fter they come in 
there they took in big car loads of stuff. They 
come eYer~· three or four da~'s and filled up 
their "~hole basement. At first thev were in 
the Block. and they bought a building on the 
north of that and then I heard there was 
son1e objection about using the alleyway, 
when they "'ere going to put up· a gate or 
something. 
Q There 'Yas just as much traffic, or I should 
say there "'"as more traffic came from up 
here than through here to service the Eagle 
block, wasn't there? 
.... \. Yes. sure. This business was only really for 
coal. That w ..as about the only business it was 
used for for the first thirty-five years I was 
up there. 
Q And the coal could have be·en delivered here 
just as easy as here? 
A It could have but it never was. They always 
come in this way. 
He also testified that some coal was delivered for 
use in his tailor shop, but this had been discontinued 
since about 1900. 
This witness did not testify that all the coal used 
in appellant's building was delivered over the 12 x 76 
foot entrance to the area-way. He stated he saw coal 
delivered ''quite often'' since 1893. This witness testi-
fied to all sorts of miscellaneous use, but the period of 
such use was since 1930, and, therefore, not within a 
prescriptive period. 
It is upon this testimony that appellant seeks to 
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establish a right-of-way. It can be s·een from the above 
s~tatement that it varies considerably, and to such an ex-
tent, that no useful purpose would he served by indi-
cating to this court wherein the statement of facts ap-
pearing in appellant's brief differ from the record. 
The only use by appellant's predecessor in title, 
over a prescriptive period, appears ·to be the induction 
of coal to appellant's stoker for some length of time, as 
testified to by Mr. Gotberg, who, on cross-examination, 
testified that all the traffic to the rear of these buildings 
came from the South, over what he described as the 
"Cullen right-of-way" (see above excerpt from tran-
script) except for some coal deliveries, for the period 
from 189'3 to 1930. 
Mr. Gotberg also testi~ied tha:t the garages located 
on respondents' premises had been there since coal was 
delivered, and that the garages, so situated, w·er,e in use 
during the period. 
It is undisputed that the garage was owned and oc-
cupied by respondents, and their predecessors in title, 
and used by them since their erection, and that all the 
area-way had been us·ed by respondents themselves, or 
the use of such area-way was permitted for their tenants. 
There is a door, located at the rear of ap·pellant's 
premises, and to the East of the one-story brick struc-
ture, and, in view of Mr. Gotberg's testimony that a 
fence existed on th:e rear line of appellant's property, 
it would affirmatively appear from the position of this 
door that access, for some years, to the rear of appel-
lant's premises had been main~tained to the East, where 
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Mr. Uotberg HIHl ~lr. La.tin1~r testified an open field 
existed for the greater part of the period involved. Ap-
pell~ts stipulate there \Yas areess to the east (Tr. 193, 
194). 
Ko claim is Inade that appellant used the area-way 
at the south of his pren1is-es to the exclusion of every one 
else including respondents. It is agreed that this a~ea 
"\Yas used by respondents, their predecessors in interest, 
together "ith their tenants and licensees. It appears fur-
ther that the respondent's garages were used as such 
for many years. 
II 
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER RESPONDENTS LAND. 
T4e physical condition, existing ~t the rear of ap-
pellant's premises, sho,vs a coal stoker on the South-
east Corner. A double garage is located 3 feet South of 
appellant's premises, and extends to the West. A one-
story brick building extends from the South ·side of ap-
pellant's main building to within a few feet of appel-
lant's South boundary. The EaS't line of ~the one-story 
brick building is due North and South of the West line 
of the tin garage (see exhibit "A"). The distance be-
tween the Southeast Corner of the one-story brick 
building and the Northwest Corner of the tin garage 
has varied from a little over 3 feet to almost 8 or 9 
feet, since the existence of these buildings. Any coal de-
livered must have been carried ov·er the fence or moved 
hy means of a chute, approximately 20 feet from the cor-
ner points of these buildings to the stoker. The placing 
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of the stoker in its position indicates that coal was de-
livered from the East side, where access has been avail-
able for the full period of its existence. 
It also seems very peculiar that from 1893 to 1930 
all traffic should come from the South, except coal de-
live.ries. It seems almost unbelievable that a vehicle, 
usually a team of horses, carrying a bulky commodity, 
'Such as coal, would prefer to back for a distance of 
approximately 150 feet from West Temple Street, as tes-
tified by Mr. Gotherg, rather than enter by pulling a 
load forward from the South, and turn around in the 
area-way. 
The trial court was present when this testimony was 
given, and was inclined to disregard this phenomenon. 
The trial court, also, had an opportunity to view these 
witness·es and the manner in which their testimony was 
given, in determining the facts concerning the delivery 
of coal. 
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the 
evidenee of any use of the 12 x 7·6 foot ·entrance by ap~­
pellant is highly unsatisfactory, and far from the posi-
tive proof thereof required to establish an .easement in 
a down-town area, where prop,erty values are the high-
est. And, that such evidence is wholly insufficient to 
sustain a finding of an easemen'.t by the trial court. 
Appellant has not pleaded a 12 x 165 foot right-of-
way, nor does th·e evidence show such use·. In other words, 
he asks the court to delineate an estate in respondents' 
property, without pleading 'the sam·e, or without proving 
it. 
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There is no t~vidence whatsoever of the use claimed. 
There is no pleading to support a finding of the burden 
imposed on respondents' land, by way of easement, nor 
is there ·even a definitive statemnt in appellant's brief 
as to the extent of such use. Notwithstanding the absence 
of these factors, appellant asks this court to determine 
the physical limits of a right-of-way, together with the 
use per1nitted on such right-of-way, after its limits are 
established by the court. This procedure is unheard of. 
In order to establish a prescriptive ·easement, there 
must be a use thereof, under a claim ·of .riglii1• The evi-
dence as to an~~ claim of right, as given by Mr. Latimer, 
is as follows : 
Direct examination, Tr. 136 :-
' • Q Let us start from the time you started the 
managing of this prop·erty for the Latimer 
heirs. Have you ever had occasion to· discuss 
the us·e of this right-of-way with anyone~ 
..._;\_ No, I haven't." 
Cross examinatio-n, Tr. 146:-
,' Q But for 15 or 20 years there was another en-
trance cut in there~ 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
The question of your using this right-of-way, 
using, you say, 1Ir. Latimer, and I ?elieve 
you're right, in this, that the question of 
these people in this part using this ·entrance 
to get to the back of the premis·es has never 
been discussed by you at all, has it~ 
I never had any trouble with anybody about 
it. 
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Q And it ha'S never been even talked of, has it 1 
A No. 
Q Do you r~em·ember Mr. Ball, who ran the 
Eagle Block, these s'tores, did you know him 1 
A Yes. 
Q And you know Mr. Ball, who is still alive 
now~ 
A Yes, I know him. 
Q And he is not too young now and his father 
before him ran it, did he not~ 
A Yes, I think so. 
Q All these other interests, and it is my infor-
mation, and I think it is a fact, is it not, you 
never had any discussion with those people 
about it1 
A That is right. 
Q You were 'there frequently with them~ 
A Yes." 
Cross examination, Tr. 147:-
' 'Q Your relations with Mr. Sdrales and Mr. 
L.atses have always been friendly and neigh-
borly while you have be·en there 1 
A Yes, sir.'' 
It is the further re-collection of counS'el for respon-
dents, and the trial court, that Mr. Latimer expressly 
testified th~t he claimed no right-of-way as. against 
r·espondents. 
It should be noted that Mr. Latimer t,estified that he 
had not discussed his right-of-way with OIYV!JOne, so he 
must not have claim~ed it. 
\ 
~ 
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In addition to the objection that no claim of right 
was ever n1ade, there is absolutely no testimony to the 
effect that any use "~hatsoever was adverse to the rights 
of respondents. 
There exists also a further reason why no prescrip-
tive right W'"as obtained by app·ellant. Respondents ae-
quired their property in 193.9, and since that time, the 
evidence of Mr. Latimer affirmatively shows that res-
pondents, or the nephe\Y of the Latsis interest, leased the 
building of appellant. The use, if any, of the Latsis in-
terest, while they were the owners of the servient es-
tate, is conclusively presumed to be p·ermissive, and not 
adverse. Therefore, for the period from 1939 to the date 
of trial, the use "~as clearly permissive, and this period 
cannot be considered in determining a prescriptive right. 
The rule of la\v sought to be invoked by appellant is 
that wh·ere a use of a way has been open, notorious, and 
con'tinuous, under a claim of right, for a p·eriod of 20 
years, a presump~tion of grant arises, and the use made 
of the servient tenement is, th·erehy, established. 
In this cas·e, however. there is no claim of right, ·nor 
was the use continuous to the time of trial, nor was any 
particular use established. Therefore, th·e authorities 
cited by app·ellant, do not apply. 
In support of respondents' contention that a pre-
scriptive right must be pleaded and proved, the court 
is referred to the case of Farr v. Wheelwright Construc-
tion C~o., 163 P. 25·6, 49 Utah 274, and to the case of B-er-
tolin-a v. F 11ates, 57 P. (2) 346, 89 Utah 238. In the latter 
case, the court, in citing the fonner case, says: 
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''As pointed out by Mr. Justice Frick in F(}Jf'r 
v. Whe,elwright Const'ruc-b:ion Co., 49 Utah 274, 
16:-3 P. 2·56, 257 : 'It should require no argument, 
howev·er, to show that where one claims an ease-
Inent over real ·property he should set forth his 
claim in apt terms in his pleading'.'' 
The 'two above cases hold squarely that to obtain 
a prescriptive easement there must be a use adverse 
and under a claim of right. The eourt, in Fiarr v. Whe,el-
wrigh.t Construction Co., sup·ra, says. 
"Appellant's counsel, however, also insists 
that the allegations of the complaint are insuffi-
cient to constitute adverse user. By again refer-
ring to the allegations of the complaint herein-
before set forth it will be seen that it is not al-
leged that the alleged use was adverse and under 
a claim of right. This court, in common with many 
other courts, has frequently held that in order to 
acquire an eas·ement or right-of-way over real es-
tate in this state by user, such user must be con-
tinuous for a period of 20 years; must be adverse 
to the true owner, and under a claim of right. 
Lwnd v. Wiloox, 34 Utah 205, 97 Pac. 33; Hark-
ness v. WoodmatnSe.e, 7 Utah 227, 26 Pac. 291; 
Funk v. Andersorn, 22 Utah 238, 61 Pac. 1006. 
Respondents' counsel S'eeks to distinguish this 
case from the cases ·we have just cited, but there 
is no distinction in principle. 
In 1 Elliott, Roads and Stre·ets (3d Ed.) :sec. 
194, in speaking of what is sufficient to consti-
tute an ~easement by user, ~the author says: 
'We have already shown thltt; the use, must 
he under claim of right. Where the· use is mere-
ly permissive and not adverse, there is no basis 
on which a right of way by prescription can 
rest'.'' 
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This court re-affir1ns the above rule in Bertolima v. 
Fra.te~, ~nprn, in the following~ language: 
~~\\~here a person claims to have acquired an 
ease1nent by prescription over another's land, he 
n1u~t ~how that he has acquired it by his own 
continuous~ open, uninteTrupted, and adverse user 
under clain1 of right for the twenty-year prescrip·-
tive period. The p·rescriptive right is based ori-
ginally llpon the 'theory of a grant implied from 
long US'er. Funk v. An.aerson, 22 Utah 2:38, ·61 P. 
1006." 
This court has also considered the claim of right 
necessary to establish an easement in Dahl v. Roach, 76 
Utah 74, 287 P. 622, where this court held that the 
claim to a right-of-way must be made known to · th·e 
owners of the s-ervient estate. This was an action by 
plaintiff to establish a right-of-way over premise'S by 
defendant. The trial court ·entered judgment in favor of 
defendant~ and plaintiff appealed. The court found that 
the appeal failed, because: 
"(1) 
(2) 
The testimony is not conclusiv·e of any 
open, adverse, continuous, uninterrupted, 
and exclusive use of the way with the 
knowledge and acquiescence of the owner 
of the servient estate, and 
It appears withthout dispute that during at 
least seven of . the years necessary to cre-
ate a prescriptive right the plaintiff oc-
cupied the premises as a tenant of the 
owner." 
As to the requisite for establishing a ·prescriptive· right-
of-way, the court said: 
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"The first headnote to Tarpey v. Heath, 22 
Cal. App 289, 134 P. 3.67, is: 'A right of w~ay 
claimed by a prescrip~tion wa:s not es~ablished 
without showing that the use w~as adverse, 0!1Ul 
under claim of right communicated to t·he !OWner, 
or was so continuous, openly and notoriously ad-
verse as to create the presumption of knowledge.' 
''Among other cases ci;ted to the same ef-
fect are: Crosier v. Br~own, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S. 
E. 326, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 174; Gardner v. Swi(Jmm, 
114 Ga. 304,40 S. E. 271; SchuZenbarger v. Johtn-
stone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843, 35 L.R.A. (N;S.) 
941; Watson v. Board of County Com'rs., 38 
Wash. 662, 80 P. 201. 
''Plaintiff makes no claim that the owner of 
the servient ·estate was ever notified that plain-
tiff claimed a right to travel over or use the way 
in controversy. Nothing was ever s1aid ~at OJYIIY time 
t~o t'he ow·we.r of the servtient estate that plaintiff 
did claim such a right. The evidence on behalf of 
defendants is to the effect that no right was ever 
granted to plaintiff to us·e· such way for any pur-
pose whatever. Moreo:ver·, the pToof by plaintiff's 
own wi'tness, of the use by plaintiff of defendant 
Jeremy's land, does not show that in driving 
cattle to or oveT said premises, or in driving 
wagons or other vehicles thereover, they were 
confined to any particular strip or portion of 
Jeremy's land. In fact, the testimony fails to show 
a continuous and ~exclusive use of the right of 
way not only for 'the prescriptive period, but for 
any length of time whatever.'' 
The California decisions hold to the same effect, 
and, as to the rule invoked in the factual situation exist-
ing in this case, see Smith v. Skrbeck, 162 P. (2) 674. 
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This ''"as an aetion by· plaintiff against defendant to es-
tablish a right-of-way by prescription. Defendant cross-
complained to quiet title to their property free and 
clear of the alleged right-of-way. From a judgment for 
defendants, plaintiff appealed. As to the proof nece"S'Sary 
to establish a right-of-way, the court said: 
'' ",.. e 1nay assum·e from testimony adduced by 
plaintiff that she and her husband used the road-
,yay ""'henever they had occasion to tr·avel that 
way: but such use is insufficient to establish a 
prescriptive title, unless there is evidence that 
such use was made for the prescriptive p·eriod, 
under claim of right made known to, -or asserted 
in. such manner as t·o make known 't:o, the titular 
owner a knowledge of the asserted claim. There 
is no evidence that plaintiff -ever ·asserted any 
such claim to the previous owner, defendants' 
grantor, or that her occasional use of the road 
was not with his permission and a a neighborly 
accommodation. W·e cannot assume, in the ab-
sence of ·evidence, that the prior owner had know-
ledge, either actual or constructive, that plain-
tiff's use was hostile or adverse." 
and further: 
''The right to the us-e of a roadway over 
another man's land may be acquired by grant or 
by prescription. A prescriptive right to a road-
way may he secured only by clear evidence of ad-
verse use, openly, notoriously and continuously 
ass-erted for a p·eriod of five years or more. The 
cZaim of right must be commu.nioat-ed to the owner 
of the land, or the use of the roadway must he so 
obvious as to constitute implied notice of the ad-
verse claim. The burden is on one who claim-s a 
prescriptive right to use a private roadway to 
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affirmativ·ely prov·e the essential elements there-
of. O~arke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 66 P. 10; Grim-
mesey v. Kirtlan, 93 Cal. App. 658, 270 P. 243; 1 
Cal. Jur. 608, sec. 81; 2 C.J.S., Adverse Posses-
sion, p. 558, sec. 45. ~' 
The san1e rule was applied in the California case 
of ·D01oling v. Dabel, 186 P. (2') 183, (California 1947). 
In this case, the court held that using the land of another 
for several years, without protest from the owner, does 
not establish an easement. The court said: 
''We are of the opinion ·the findings and judg-
m·ent are adequately supported by the evidence. 
A prescriptive right to an easement in a road-
way over the real property of another person 
may he acquired only by clear evidence of ad-
v·ers·e use, openly, notoriously and continuously 
asserted for the statutory period of five years. 
The claim of right must be communicated to the 
owner of the land, ·or the use of the roadway must 
be so obviously exercised as to constitute an im-
plied notice of the adverse claim.'' 
The Supreme Court of Arizona had this same prob-
lem before it in LaRue v. KO'sich, 187 P. (2) 642. In this 
ca:s·e, no claim to a right-of-way was ever made by the 
p·ersons claiming it to those persons owning ·the servient 
tenement. On this phase of the case, the court said: 
' ' Again, in the same cas·e the court further 
said: 'The defendant and his tenants were in the 
habit of passing over the unenclosed strip of 
land when going to o~ from their business. The 
question as to whe!ther or not the use was under 
a claim of right, or a mer·e matter of neighborly 
accommodation, was a question of fact to be de-
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termined by the court in the light of the relations. 
of the parties, their conduct, the situation of the 
property, and all the surrounding circumstances. 
The court below saw the witnesses, heard them 
testify, and found the facts against the defendant. 
Defendant testified that he used the way and 
claimed the right to use it, but it does not appear 
that any such claim was ever made to plaintiff 
or to his grantor. It is not sufficient that the claim 
of right exists only in the mind of the person 
claiming it. It muSit in some way be assert·ed in 
such manner that the owne.r may know :of the 
cla.int.. The fact that the owner knew of the travel 
and occasional us·e of the property does not ever 
rais-e a pr·esumption that such use was hostile or 
under claim of right. If any p~arty who is allowed 
by silent permission to pass over the lands of 
another, nothing being said as to any right being 
claimed, after five years, without showing that 
he ·ever communicated such claim in any way to 
the owner, can thus gain title by pre'Scription, it 
would be a blot upon the law. An owner could not 
allow his neighbor to pass and repass over !1 
trail, upon his open, unenclosed land, without 
danger of having an adverse title successfully set 
up against him. If he had sev·eral neighbo;rs who 
so used the land, several separate titles to right 
of way might thus be acquired. The law will pre·-
sume that the land belongs to the own·er of th·e 
paper title, and tha:t the use was by permission 
or silent acquiescence. If this presump~tion is 
overcome by evidence showing the use to have 
been hostile, and that the owner knew of such 
hostile claim and took no steps to protect his pro-
perty for a period of five years, then the pre·-
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sumption changes.' (Emphasis supplied.) '' 
"F,rom his testimony, it will be noted that 
plaintiff used the way and claimed a right to use 
it but it does not appear that any such claim was 
·ever made to the defendant or to his grantor 
prior to the building of the fence.'' 
Mr. Latimer testified that he had never seen coal 
delivered, and had neV~er made a claim to a right-of-
way here involved. Mr. Gotberg, as indicated in ap·pel-
lant 's brief on page 21, testified that ·he had seen a coal 
truck com·e over the purported right-of-way ''quite of-
ten." No case has ever held that a right-of-way could be 
established on such testimony. 
Appellant here tries to sustain the position that 
his use of the premis,es was "notorious" and "continu-
ous,'' yet Mr. Latimer, the owner for most of the period, 
has never seen a coal truck come in on the right-of-way, 
which is an instance of the claimed us~e. 
If the appellant is to prevail in this case, the court, 
upon its own motion~ will be required to define the phy-
sical limits of a right-of-way, and to ·establish, with cer-
tainty, the use to which such right-of-way can be put by 
appellant. And, this use must include what type of ve-
hicle can use such right-of-way, and on what occasions, 
in order that respondents can restrict any excessive use 
over that so established. 
It is submitted that no evidence on eith·er of the 
above propositions is contained in this record on appeaL 
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III 
NO PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASE-
MENT ARISES, BECAUSE THE UNCONTROVERTED 
EVIDENCE IS THAT THE LAND SOU,GHT TO BE SUB-
JECTED BY APPELLANT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE 
RIGHT, WAS USED IN COMMO·N WITH RESPON-
DENTS. 
The land owned by appellant and respondents was 
never in a common grantor, so no question of implie·d 
or reserved easement is involved in this case at all. Nor 
is there any question of an easem·e,nt arising from ne-
cessity. 
Respondents, in pointing out that the rear of ap-
pellant's premises was accessible from other direction, 
did so only to show that there was no use of the par-
ticular ground, as claimed by appellant. 
The evidence, on behalf of all parties, shows con-
clusively that the rear area-way was used by a number 
of people, and, perhaps, by the public. The 12 x 16'5 foot 
area, claimed by appellant in his brief as a right-of-way, 
extends from West Temple Street in a straight line to 
respondents' garages, and thes-e garages, it is un·dis-
puted, were continually in use, as was th~e 12-foot ex-
tension of the alley-way. 
An examination of respondents' EXhibit'' A'' clear-
ly shows the relative position of the respondents' gar-
ages and the South prop~erty line of appellant's land. 
Any use of these garages requires traffic over the strip 
claimed by appellant as a right-of-way. 
From this exhibit, it can be s·een tha:t any use of this 
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area-way by respondents, in servicing the rear of their 
buildings, necessarily requires th_e use of the greater por-
tion of the right-of-way now claim-ed by appellant. 
These facts stand undisputed, as does, the fact that 
the ar·ea-way was used by respondents, and their prede-
cessors in title. Ther·efore, if there was any use of this 
area by appellant, or his predecessors, it was in com-
mon with owners of respondents' p·r~emis·es. This factual 
situation is the deeisive feature of this case. 
Assuming appellant had proved a sufficient use of 
the premises, his right to an ·easement depends entirely 
on favorable presumptions of law with regard to all 
the necessary elements, because there ·exists no express 
grant of this estate to him. How·ever, no such presump-
tions arise under the facts in this case, because the land 
sought to be impressed with an easement was used in 
common with the owner. 
The law is well-established that, when one con-
structs, maintains, or us·e·s a right-of-way on his own 
land, and his neighbor, or some adjacent property owp.er, 
uses the same area, that no pr•esumption of adverse use 
aris~s, but that a presumption of permissive us·e arise'S. 
A permissive use, for no matt·er how long, cannot ripen 
int:o an easement. 
This doctrine has been maintained by this court 
since the case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 
26 P. 291, wher·e the court stated the rule to be: 
''Where a person opens a way for the use of 
his own premises, and another person uses it also 
without causing damage, the presump'tion IS, in 
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the absenre of eYidence to the contrary, that such 
use by the latter was permissive, and not under 
a clain1 of right. W a~hb. Easem. 151.'' 
This rule '""as re-affirm·ed in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 
Utah 4-81~ 39 P. (2) 1070, where the court says: 
''A twenty-year use alone of a way is not suf ... 
ficient to establish an easement. M·ere use of a 
road,vay opened by a landowner for his own pur-
pos-es will be presum-ed permissive. An antagon-
istic or adverse use of a way cannot spring from 
a permissive use. A prescriptive title must be 
acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when it 
rests upon a license or mere neighborly accom-
modation. Adverse user is the antithesis of per-
missive user. If the use is accompanied by any 
recognition in express terms or by implica:tion of 
a right in the landowner to stop such us·e now 
or at some time in the future, the use is not ad-
v·erse.'' 
In the recent case of Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 
514, 175 P. (2) 714, cited by appellant, th·e rule is recog-
nized in the following language: 
''It is contended that the road and the gate 
in the fence at the west: terminus of the road w•ere 
opened for and used by the landowner and that 
Zollinger's use of the road did not injure the land 
and did not int·erfere with the landowneT's use of 
same and therefore his use was p·ermissive and 
under the landowner. In the early case of Hark-
ness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291, 293, 
this court recogniz·ed the p·rinciple ·as follows: 
'Where a person opens a way for the use of his 
own premises, and another person uses. it also 
without causing ·damage, the presumption is, in 
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the absenee of evidence to the contrary, that such 
us~e by the latter was permissive, and not under 
claim of right'.'' 
The question is annotated in 170 A.L.R. page 825, 
where the rule is stated as follows : 
''Where the way in ques'tion is shown to have 
been opened or maintained by the owner of the 
soil for his own benefit, and the claimant's use of 
it appears to have been merely in common with 
him, no presumption arises that the latter's use 
of it was adverse or under a ·claim of right. In 
the absence of addiitonal circumstances p~ertain­
ing to the origin or nature of the claimant's use, 
and expressing a purpose to impos·e a separate 
servitude upon the land, the use is presumed to 
be permissiv~e only." 
Numerous cases are cited in this note. 
In 19 C. J. at page 898, the rule is stated thus: 
''Section 7·5. USE BY OWNER FO·R 
HIS 0·\VN PURPOSES. Wher~e a landowner 
opens up a way on his own land for his own use 
and convenience, the mere use thereof by another, 
under circumstances which do not injure the road 
nor int~erfere with the owner's use of it, will not 
in the absence of circumstances indicating a claim 
of right be considered as adverse, and will not 
ripen into a prescriptive right no matter how 
long continued. Where ·a sp,ace is left open by the 
.owner for his own convenience the presurrnptiofflt 
ordin,arily is that the use of such space by atn-
o,tlter, ev·en for his ·own purtp,ose, is permissive. 
Nevertheless, it has been held that the mer~e fact 
that a way has been established by the owner of 
the land for his own use does not of itself prevent 
a user of the way by ano'ther from becoming ad-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
verse. But in order to acquire this charact,er 
kno"rledge must be brought home to the owner 
of th~e land that the user is claimed .as of right. 
The requirement is not satisfied by keeping the 
road in repair for the us·e of both parties, or by 
constructing and maintaining bridges on it. And 
it has been held that the fact that a 't:enant of one 
claiming an easement in a right of way by adv.erse 
user had complained, on one occasion, that poles 
,,~hich had been piled on the way obstructed it, 
and that the agent of the owner remo¥ed the 
san1e, \Yas not evidence of an assertion of right to 
use the way sufficient to rip·en into title by ad-
verse us~er. '' · 
The texts cited above are amply supported in many 
recent decisions, among which are the following: 
Smith v · Skrbek, 162 P. ( 2) 67 4, (California 1945). 
The evidence in this case was that the defendant con-
structed the road for his own use, and that, thereafter, 
plaintiff used it with defendant, as a common means 
of access. ''Then this condition exists, the court, quoting 
Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P. (2) 1070, (Utah), said: 
"It is a reasonable presumption that since 
the roadway was constructed by the defendants' 
predecessor in title, upon his own land, for his 
personal benefit, as a means of aceess from the 
public highway to his dwelling h~ouse and farm 
buildings, that the plaintiff's use of the road was 
merely perimssive, as a neighborly convenience. 
Jensen v. Ger~ard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070; 
28 C-.J.S., Eeasements, p. 668, sec. 18(2). In the 
text last cited it is said : 'Wher;e a landowner 
opens up a way on his own land for his own use 
and convenience, th~e me:ve use thereof by another, 
under circumstances which do not injure the road 
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nor interfere with the owner's use of it, will not 
in the abs·ence of circumstances indicating a claim 
of right be considered as adverse, and will not 
rip~en into a prescriptive right no matter how long 
continued.' 
''In this case there is no evidence that the 
plaintiff or her predecessor in title helped to con-
struct or keep in repair the roadway over de-
fendants' land. No actual notice of her claim of 
prescriptive . right to tra:vel ~the·. road was ever 
given. Although the de£endants talked with her 
about their title to the land before they purchased 
the· ranch in November, 1941, and again while 
they wer~e changing the course of the road in Au-
gust, 1942, she failed to mention her claim to a 
right to use the road. Plaintiff's occasional use 
of the road for a short distance of less than a 
hundr'ed feet from the highway to her garage and 
gate did not interfere in the least with defen-
dant's use thereof.'' 
The late·r California cas'e of Do'o,ling v. Dabel, 186 
P. (2) 183, (California 1947), affirms this rule in the 
following language : 
" 'It is a reasonable presumption that since 
the roadway was constructed by the defendants' 
predecessor in title, upon his own land, for his 
personal benefit, as means of access from the 
public highway to his dwelling hous~e and farm 
buildings, that the plaintiff's use of the road was 
m~erely permissive, as a neighborly convenience. 
Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070; 
28 C.J.'S., Easements, p. 668, sec. 18(2). In the 
text last cited it is said : 
'' 'Where a landowner opens up a way on his 
own land for his own use and convenience, the 
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mere use thereof by another, under circumstances 
which do not injure the road nor interfere with 
the O\vner 's use of it, will not in the absence of 
circumstances indicating a claim of right be con-
sidered as adverse, and will not ripen into a pre-
scriptive right no n1atter how long continued'. 
The preceding declaration of laws appears to fit the 
facts of this cas·e. 
In LaR·ue v. Kosich, 187 P. (2) 642, (Arizona 1947), 
the evidence was to the effect that the persons seeking 
the easement, us·ed the premises together with the own-
ers and others. The court held permission of the owner 
·was conclusively presum·ed, in the following language·: 
"'It is a recognized rule of law that wher1e 
the use of a private way by a neighbor is by the 
express or implied permission of the owner, the 
continued use is not advers'e and cannot rip,en 
into a prescriptive right. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. 0'11o-ckett, etc., Co., 70 .Cal. App. 283, 233 P. 370; 
May Bernard, 40 Cal. Ap.p. 364, 180 P. 827; Ir-
vin v. Petitfils, 44 Cal. App. 2d 496, 112 P. 2d 
688. The law raises no presumption that the use 
is under a claim of right. 28 C.J.S., Easements, 
s·ec. 18(i); Bovullvou.n v. Consto.mtine, 186· Ark. 625, 
54 S.W. 2d 986; Schudel v. H.ertz, 125 Cal. App. 
564, 13 p. 2d 1008, 1186. 
"Under a heading, 'Way by prescription 
when use is permissive only,' it is said in 2 
T·hompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) s~ec. 521: 
'The modern tendency is to restrict th·e right of 
one to acquire a prescriptive right of way wher~e­
by another, through a mere neighborly act, may 
be dep,rived of his property by its becoming vest-
ed in the one whom he favored. * * * * ' 
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"It is said in How,ard v. Wright, 38 Nev. 25, 
143 P. 1184, 1188: 
'A right of way by prescription can only 
be acquired by a user which is neither ex-
pressly nor impli,edly licensed or permissive. 
I~t must be adverse and hostile to the owner 
of the servient estate, and mus't be under a 
claim of right so expressed as to charge the 
owner of the servient estate with knowledge 
thereof. ' 
* * * * 
'Nothing less than an adverse user, un-
der claim of legal right, will perfect an ·ease-
ment by occupancy for the statutory time. 
A use acquired merely by cons~ent, permis-
sion, or indulgence of the owner of the ser-
vient estate, can never ripen into a prescri~ 
tive right, unless the user of the dominant 
estate expressly abandons and denies his 
right under licens·e or permission, and open-
ly declares his right to he adverse to the 
owner of the s-ervient estate. Hurt v. Atlams, 
86 !1:o. App. 73. · 
* * * * 
'The rule that precludes a permtSsvve 
use from ripening int~o a .right t~o covntinue:d 
·enjoyment, w~ere the permission, oonsent, 
or license is expressly given is no less e ff ec-
vive where the permission or license mruy be 
implied. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 
12 P. ·491.' (Emphasis supplied.) 
''The evidence present~ed in the cas~e at bar 
conclusively shows that the plaintiff, together 
with the general public, had enjoyed implied per-
missiv~e use of the roadway through the neighbor-
ly indulgence of its owner and his predecessors in 
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interest. And, a use that has its inception in the 
pennission of the owner will continu~e as such un-
til a distinct and positive assertion of a right 
hostile to the owner is brought home to him by 
words or acts. Omodt v. Chicag~o, M. & 8t. P. R.y. 
Co., 106 ~Iinn. 205, 118 N.W. 798; Clarke v. · 
Clarke. 133 Cal. 667, 66 P. 10: How·a.rd v. Wright, 
38 Nev. 25, 143 P. 1184~ B'liarndon v. Umpqua Lbr. 
& Tin1ber Co., 26 Cal. App. 96, 146 P. 46; Scheller 
L'. Pierce County, 55 Wash. 298, 104 P. 277; Pitz-
man v. Bo,yce, 111 ~lo. 387, 19 S.W. 1104, 33 Am. 
St. Rep. 536; Snlith v. Oliver, 189 Ky. 214, 2'24 
S.W. 683: Smith v. Ftairfax, 180 Ky. 12, 201 S.W. 
454; Fla.gg c. Phillips, 201 Mass. 216, 87 N.E. 598; 
Holm v. Da.v·is, 41 Utah 200, 12·5 P. 403, 44 L .. R.A., 
N.'S .. , 89 ~ "f.. ... aporroa v. Weckwerth, 178 Minn. 203, 
226 N.W. 569, 65 A.L.R. 124; Johnson v. Olson, 
189 ~finn. 183, 248 N.W. 700; Reider v. Orme, 17 
Tenn. App. 497, 68 S.W. 2d 960." 
The Supreme Court of l\fontana, in White v. [(,amp's, 
171 P. (2) 343, (Montana 1946), affirms this rule, and 
propounds the sound reasoning underlying it, in the fol-
lowing language : 
''In Scheller v. Pierce County, ·55 Wash. 298, 
104 P. 277, 278, it was said, in quoting from Jones 
on Easements, section 282: 
' ''If the use of a way over one's land 
is shown to be permissive only, no right to 
use it is conferred, though the use may have 
continued for a century or any length of 
time. 'A different doctrine would haVie the 
tendency to destroy all neighborhood accom-
modation in the way of travel; for if it were 
once understood that a man, by allowing his 
neighbor to pass through his farm without 
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objection, over the pass \Vay 'vhich he us·ed 
himself, would thereby, after the lapse of 20 
or 30 years, confer a right on him to require 
the passage.wa.y to be kept open for his bene-
fit and ·enjoyment, a prohibition against all 
such travel would immediately ensue. To 
create the presumption of a grant of a right 
of way, the circumstances attending its us!e 
must be such as to make it appear that it was 
established for the benefit of the claimant, 
or that its us·e was accompanied by a claim 
of right, or by such acts as manifested an 
intention to enjoy it, without regard to the 
wishes of the owner of the land. The use 
must have been enjoyed under such circum-
stances as will indicate that it has been claim-
eel as a right, and has not been regarded by 
the partie·s merely as a privilege, revocable 
at the pleasure of the owner of the soil.' '' 
Jones on Easements, Sec. 282.' 
''The record here shows that the road in 
ques'tion was used by the respondent and his pre-
decessors in interest for their own purposes in 
farming the land involved. Under such circum-
stances the general rule is that the use of the road 
by another will generally be r~egarded as permis-
sive where such use does not injure or interfe~e 
with the owner's use. In 28 C.J.S., Easements, 
Sec. 18, p. 668, the rule is stated thus: 
'vVhere a landowner opens up a way on 
his own land for his own use and conven-
ience, the mere use thereof by another, under 
circumstances which do not injure the road 
nor interfere with the owner's use of it, will 
not in the absence of circumstances indicat-
ing a claim of right be considered as adverse, 
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and "'ill not ripen into a prescriptiv~e right 
no matter how long continued. Where a S1pace 
is left open by the owner for his own conven-
ience the presumption ordinarily is that the, 
use of such space by anoth~er, even for his 
own purpose, is permissive. N evert.heless, 
the mere fact that a way has be~en established 
by the owner of the land for his own us~e 
does not of itself prevent a user of the way 
by another from becon1ing adverse, as by 
some act or circumstance showing a claim 
of an exclusive or peculiar right in claim-
ant distinct from that of the general public. 
'However, in order to acquire this ad-
verse character knowledge must be brought 
home to the owner of the land that the ·uS'er 
is claimed as of right. The r~equirement is 
not satisfied by keeping the road in repair 
for the use of both parties, or by constructing 
and maintaining bridges on it. It has also 
been held that the m~ere fact that a tenant of 
one claiming an eas·ement in a right of way 
by adverse user had complained, on one oc-
casion, that poles which had been piled on 
the way obstructed it, and that the agent of. 
the own~er removed the saine, is not ·evidence 
of an assertion of right to use the way suffi-
cient to ripen into title by adverse us~er.' See 
supporting authorities cited. 
"In Boward v. Wright, 38 Nev. 25, 143 P. 
1184, it is said : ' . . . the law in this respect is well 
established that where the owner of land opens 
a road across it for his own use and keeps it 
open f.or his own use, the fact that he sees his 
neighbor, or other parties, also making us-~ ·~f it 
under circumstances that do not tend to InJure 
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the road or interrere that he is yielding to his 
express claim of right, or that his neighbor is 
asserting any right.' 
"To the same ·eff·ect is the case of Anthony 
v. K e'YifYI;ard Bldg. C~o., 188 M-o. 704, 87 S.W. 921." 
Chief Justice Budge, in Si:mmons v. Perkins, 118 P. 
( 2) 7 40, cites numerous State decisions, including Utah, 
in upholding this same doctrine. At p. 744, the Idaho 
'Supreme Court says : 
''The rule would s~e·em to be that where the 
owner of real property constructs a way over it 
for his own us~e and convenience, the mere use 
thereof by others whic;h in no way interereres with 
his use will be pTesumed to be by way of license 
or permission. Harkness v. Woodmamsee, 7 Utah 
227,2:6 P. 291; How,ar'd v. Wright, 38 Nev. 26,143 
P. 1184; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 
N.W. 925; Burk v. Diers, 102 Neb. 721, 169 N.W. 
263 ;Long v. MOiJJberry, 96 T~enn. 378, 36 S.W. 
1040~ Ra,rish v. Caspar, 109· Ind. 586, 10 N.E. 109; 
Null v. Williamson, 16·6 Ind. 537, 78 N.E. 76; 
Gascho v. Lewnert, 176 Ind.· 677, 97 N.E. 6; Kil-
burn v. Adams, Mass., 7 Me'tc. 33, 39 Am. D·ec. 
754; 18 C. J. Sec. 120, p. 105; 26 C.J.S., Dedica-
tion, s:ec. 19. 
''The use of a driveway in common with the 
owner and the general public, in the absence of 
s-ome decisive act on the user's part indicating a 
separate and exclusive use on his part negatives 
any presumption of individual right therein in 
his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 66 P. 
10~ Heenqm v. Bev-ans, 51 Cal. App. 277, 196 P. 
802; B'Y"ad~ord v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 
925; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N. Y. 357, 7 N.E. 2d 
26-2, 111 A.L.R. 216. '' 
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The soundness of this rule of law bec:omes apparent 
in the situation existing here. Respondents' buildings 
are leased and occupied by a number of commercial en-
terprises. The people 'vith whom ~their tenants do busi-
ness are pern1itted the use of the premises, and the:se 
people are unlmown to respondents. In order to keep, 
their neighbors from imposing an encumbrance on their 
premises, respondents would be required to police all 
the entrances thereto, and identify those seeking admit-
tance. This procedure is, obviously, burdensome, and, as 
the courts indira te, mitigates against neighborliness, and, 
therefore, license or p·ermission is presumed in the ab-
sence of actual notice of a claim of right. 
If such notice is brought home to the servient owner, 
then he can take steps to protect himself, by fencing, 
and thereby obstructing access along the p·roperty line 
between his land and the land of the person claiming 
an easement. No such notice exists in this case. The af-
firmative evidence is that the respective owners were 
friendly and good neighbors. 
IV. 
ANSWER TO~ PETITIO·N TO STRIKE PORTION 
O·F BILL OF EXCEPTIONS 
Ap·pellant objects to the proceedings appearing in 
Pages 140 to 145 of the Record. 
At the conclusion of the case, and on the argument 
of the· motion for a new trial, Judge Van Cott expressed 
himself to the effect that Mr. Latimer had testified he 
had not claimed a right-of-way. No particular objection 
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was made in either instanee by counsel for appellant. 
The transcript was furnished counsel for respond-
ents, and they were asked to S'tipulate to the effect that 
such transcript could he settled as the bill of exceptions. 
Upon examination, couns·el discovered that the disputed 
testimony did not appear in this transcript, and this fact 
was referred to the trial court, which resulted in the sup-
plemental proceedings complained of. 
The statutes involved, obviously, require the trial 
court to resolve any disputes as to what the bill of excep .... 
tions contains. This was done according to the recollec-
tion of the court and counsel, in trying ·to correct what 
appears to he a mistake of the reporter. 
An examination of the procedeings indicats that the 
greater part thereof was made at the instanee of appel-
lant, to which he now objects. 
It is submitted that no prejudic.e resulted therefrom. 
Counsel for appellant had notice of the obj~ections made 
by respondents to the settling of the bill, and, if the fact 
\\ras otherwise than as express~ed by the court and coun-
sel for respondents, he had an opportunity to bring 
Mr. Latimer before the court and resolve the question. 
Counsel did not see fit to do this, and is, 'th~erefore, in 
no position to compiain. 
v. 
CO·NCLUSION 
Appellant objects to the taxing of costs in the sum 
of $13.20 being made in the absence of the s-erving and 
filing of a cost bill, as provided by the statute. 
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His position in this n1atter appears to be correct, 
and respondents have satisfi~e-d this judgment for cost, 
together \Yith interest, in the proper manner. No objec-
tion \Yas made to this cost item prior to this appeal, and 
it can, therefore, be assumed that this n1a:t:t·e-r was not 
the primary factor in the appeal. No such claim is made 
and. no prejlHlice has resulted. 
In the trial of this action, the appellant had the 
burden of proving that an eaS'ement was. established by 
his us·e of respondents' premises for th·e prescriptive 
period. The trial court found that there was a failure- of 
proof in this respect. 
There is no evidence of adverse use or a claim of 
right. Appellant attempts to invoke the rul·e of law that 
an established use of the ground for the prescriptive per-
iod gives rise to presumptions of advers·e use and a 
claim of right. The~e is no evidence of an established 
use. 
Appellant, in the conclusion of his brief, states : 
''The defendant cle-arly showed that he had 
an open, continuous and notorious use of their 
right .... of-way for a period in excess of forty years, 
and that such use gives him a presumption of 
adverse use necessary to es~tablish a prescriptive 
easement. ' ' 
How can a use be continuous and notorious, when the 
owner, Mr. Latimer, who must sustain such an assertion, 
has ne"\Trer in his life s·een respondents' premises so used. 
No conte-ntion is, or can be, made that the use claim-
ed is exclusive. Any use made of these premises was in 
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common wi~th respondents' us~e. This being the admitted 
case, the le:gal presumption arising from this fact is that 
such us~e was permissive~, and could never ripen into an 
easement. 
In view of this circumstance, appellant could not 
prevail, ~even though he had proved a sufficient use. 
The use, if any, made of 'the premises by appellant 
was in common with the owner, and makes unnecessary 
a determination of the fact as to wheth·er the us-e was 
sufficient to ·establish an easement, which is the ground 
of ap·pellant's appeal. 
It is submitted that the trial court did not err in 
applying the foregoing principles of law to the facts in 
this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE and MULLINER 
.Attorneys for Responde'nts. 
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